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Giving	Up	On	Moral	Truth	Shall	Set	You	Free:	Walzer	on	Relativism,	Criticism,	
and	Toleration1	
David	Lefkowitz,	University	of	Richmond	
Morality,	Michael	Walzer	contends,	is	not	singular,	objective,	and	universal,	a	
principle	or	code	applicable	to	all	people	at	all	times	independent	of	whatever	they	
happen	to	believe.		Rather,	it	is	plural,	subjective	or	belief-dependent,	and	concrete,	
a	multitude	of	moralities	or	moral	ways	of	life	created	over	time	by	the	members	of	
distinct	historically	situated	communities.2		This	conventional	or	culturally	relative	
account	of	the	nature	of	morality	entails	that	we	must	abandon	the	familiar	notion	
of	moral	truth,	according	to	which	at	least	some	claims	of	the	form	‘it	is	wrong	to	ϕ’	
are	true	in	virtue	of	their	tracking	or	reflecting	objective	and	universal	moral	
principles	binding	on	all	moral	agents	as	such.		Many	of	Walzer’s	critics	take	this	
implication	to	constitute	a	reductio	ad	absurdum	refutation	of	Walzer’s	relativist	
meta-ethics.		But	what	precisely	do	we	lose	if	we	give	up	on	moral	truth	so	
conceived?		Not	a	criterion	to	use	in	comparing	different	moralities	or	moral	ways	of	
life,	I	argue	in	the	first	section	of	this	paper.		Nor,	as	I	demonstrate	in	section	II,	are	
we	left	without	a	standard	for	assessing	or	selecting	among	competing	moral	
																																																								
1	Published	in	Revue	Internationale	de	Philosophie	274:4	(2015):	385-398,	with	a	reply	from	Michael	
Walzer.	
2	This	characterization	of	Walzer’s	meta-ethical	position	may	seem	to	be	at	odds	with	his	professed	
commitment	to	reiterative	universalism.		As	I	argue	below,	however,	the	universality	to	which	
Walzer	refers	in	his	account	of	reiterative	universalism	concerns	human	beings’	nature	as	moral	
makers	and,	to	some	extent,	the	circumstances	in	which	moral	making	takes	place.		What	is	universal	
is	the	existence	of	a	morality	in	all	human	societies,	moralities	that,	to	paraphrase	Walzer,	are	plural	
in	their	incidence	and	differentiated	in	their	outcomes	–	but	not	wholly	differentiated,	as	if	the	agents	
and	subjects	of	all	moralities	had	no	common	kinship	(“Nation	and	Universe,”	reprinted	in	Thinking	
Politically:	Essays	in	Political	Theory	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2007):	199).		What	Walzer	
denies	is	the	existence	of	an	objective	and	universal	moral	principle	or	code	binding	on	all	human	
agents	in	virtue	of	their	rationality,	or	being	made	in	God’s	image,	etc.,	that	need	only	be	combined	
with	factual	claims	in	a	deductive	argument	to	generate	situation-specific	moral	conclusions.	
	 2	
arguments,	i.e.	answers	to	questions	regarding	how	we	ought	to	live	posed	at	
varying	levels	of	specificity.		Moreover,	I	argue	in	section	III	that	if	we	give	up	on	the	
idea	of	universal	and	objective	moral	truth,	and	so	the	possibility	of	justifying	the	
coercive	imposition	of	our	moral	norms	on	other	moral	communities	on	the	grounds	
that	they	would	accept	them	if	they	were	rational,	impartially	benevolent,	open	to	
God’s	wisdom,	etc.,	we	will	be	disposed	to	tolerate	the	different	ways	of	life	they	
seek	to	lead.		Unlike	the	discussion	in	the	first	two	sections,	which	aims	largely	to	
explicate	Walzer’s	views,	the	argument	set	out	in	this	last	section	differs	from	what	
Walzer	himself	says.		Nevertheless,	I	argue	that	the	case	for	toleration	I	offer	on	his	
behalf	better	coheres	with	Walzer’s	overall	account	of	the	nature	of	morality	than	
does	his	own.		
I.	 	
I	begin	with	a	brief	description	of	the	central	role	played	by	the	concept	of	
legitimacy	in	Walzer’s	account	of	the	nature	of	morality	and	the	practice	of	moral	
justification.		Legitimacy	characterizes	a	relationship	between	a	person	and	a	norm	
or	standard	of	right	conduct,	one	in	which	the	individual	takes	the	norm	in	question	
to	provide	him	with	a	reason	for	action.		For	example,	a	person	who	takes	as	
legitimate	a	law	prohibiting	some	act-type	A	believes	he	has	a	reason	not	to	perform	
tokens	of	that	act-type	simply	because	the	law	prohibits	it.		If	we	assume	for	
simplicity’s	sake	that	this	is	his	only	reason	not	to	perform	acts	of	this	type,	then	
should	he	be	called	upon	to	justify	his	refusing	to	A	he	will	point	to	its	illegality	in	
his	defense;	that	is,	as	a	sufficient	reason	for	refusing	to	A.		On	Walzer’s	conventional	
account	of	morality,	legitimacy,	not	truth,	provides	the	standard	for	assessing	the	
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success	of	both	moral	arguments,	i.e.	attempts	at	moral	justification,	and	concrete	
ways	of	life,	i.e.	moralities.		I	explain	each	of	these	claims	in	turn.			
	 Consider	the	practice	of	moral	justification,	of	guiding	one’s	conduct	
according	to	moral	norms,	as	well	as	appealing	to	moral	norms	to	criticize	others’	
conduct	and	to	defend	one’s	own	conduct	against	others’	criticisms	of	it.		According	
to	the	view	Walzer	rejects,	morality	consists	of	universal	and	objective	principles	
that	are	either	discovered	by	revelation	or	by	the	exercise	of	a	universal	moral	
sense,	or	that	are	constructed	by	rational	agents	as	such.		On	this	view,	moral	claims	
are	justified	when	they	are	true;	that	is,	when	they	track	or	reflect	universal	and	
objective	moral	principles.		In	contrast,	Walzer	maintains	morality	is	nothing	more	
than	the	system	of	norms	a	particular	community	has	developed	over	time	to	make	
or	mark	certain	goals	as	worthy	or	unworthy	of	pursuit,	and	to	regulate	their	
interactions	with	one	another	(and	typically	with	members	of	other	communities	as	
well).		Moral	justification,	then,	always	involves	reference	to	and	interpretation	of	a	
given	community’s	socially	constructed	ideals.		To	claim	that	equal	concern	requires	
the	performance	of	certain	act-types	but	not	others	–	to	take	one	of	Walzer’s	favorite	
examples,	the	social	provision	of	the	care	of	bodies	but	not	of	souls	–	is	to	claim	that	
the	conception	of	equal	treatment	to	which	those	addressed	by	the	argument	are	
committed	is	best	understood	to	require	the	social	provision	of	healthcare	but	not	
soulcraft.		So	understood,	the	success	of	a	moral	argument	is	a	matter	of	its	
acceptance	or	uptake	by	members	of	that	community.		What	makes	a	moral	
argument	a	good	argument	is	not	that	it	tracks	an	objective	and	universal	moral	
principle	but	that	it	is	an	interpretation	of	a	socially	constructed	ideal	that	achieves	
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legitimacy,	i.e.	that	is	treated	as	authoritative	by	members	of	the	community	to	
whom	the	argument	is	directed.	
	 But	what	makes	a	moral	norm	legitimate?		That	is,	what	justifies	members	of	
a	given	community’s	belief	that	they	ought	to	conform	to	a	particular	moral	norm	M	
that	governs	the	performance	of	some	act-type	A,	rather	than	rival	norms	N	or	O?		
Just	as	the	moral	objectivist	must	offer	both	an	account	of	the	nature	of	moral	truth	
and	an	account	of	the	features	in	virtue	of	which	moral	claims	are	true	(e.g.	being	
the	product	of	agreement	among	rational	agents),	so	too	the	moral	relativist	must	
offer	an	account	of	the	nature	of	legitimacy	and	the	features	in	virtue	of	which	
particular	moral	norms	achieve	legitimacy.		Walzer’s	answer,	as	noted	in	the	
previous	paragraph,	is	that	a	moral	norm	achieves	legitimacy	when	(or	perhaps	
more	accurately,	to	the	degree	that)	people	in	a	given	community	take	it	to	better	
express	the	meaning	or	value	of	the	way	of	life	they	lead	than	do	its	rivals.		Answers	
to	the	question	“ought	I	to	perform	a	token	of	act-type	A”	must	appeal	to	the	
particular	identity	and	moral	world-view	of	the	person	who	poses	it.		Answers	that	
do	not,	e.g.	ones	grounded	in	divine	revelation	offered	to	non-believers,	will	not	
persuade,	and	since	legitimacy	is	all	an	argument	for	a	moral	norm	can	aspire	to,	
arguments	that	fail	to	persuade	are	defective.	
	 In	addition	to	providing	a	standard	of	success	for	moral	argument,	legitimacy	
provides	a	criterion	for	assessing	entire	moralities,	or	social	orders.			The	legitimacy	
of	a	system	of	moral	norms	that	constitutes	the	moral	culture	of	a	given	society	is	a	
function	of	three	properties:	the	percentage	of	members	who	treat	the	norms	as	
legitimate,	the	percentage	of	the	system’s	norms	they	treat	as	legitimate,	and	the	
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centrality	of	the	norms	treated	as	legitimate	to	the	way	of	life	constituted	by	the	
system	as	a	whole.		Speaking	roughly,	we	can	say	that	the	more	members	of	the	
community	in	question	guide	their	conduct	according	to	the	community’s	moral	
norms,	i.e.	take	those	norms	as	in	themselves	reasons	for	action,	the	greater	the	
legitimacy	of	the	moral	way	of	life,	or	social	order,	constituted	by	that	system	of	
moral	norms.		As	this	claim	implies,	legitimacy	is	a	scalar	notion,	and	the	limiting	
case	of	a	fully	legitimate	social	order	may	well	be	an	ideal	type	rather	than	a	state	of	
affairs	realizable	in	practice.	
	 Walzer	contrasts	a	legitimate	social	order,	one	whose	moral	norms	are	
actually	shared	and	that	constitute	a	group’s	common	life,	with	what	he	terms	
radical	coercion.3		As	a	paradigm	of	radical	coercion	he	offers	“the	extorted	
agreement”	between	slave	and	master.		The	extorted	agreement	may	constitute	a	
social	order,	in	the	sense	that	it	provides	both	the	slave	and	the	master	with	a	set	of	
norms	they	can	use	to	guide	their	behavior	and	to	form	reliable	expectations	about	
the	behavior	of	the	other.		But	those	norms	do	not	themselves	provide	the	slave	with	
reasons	for	action;	he	does	not	understand	adherence	to	the	norm	as	a	matter	of	
respect	or	concern	for	the	master,	or	as	an	expression	of	who	he	is.		Rather,	the	
slave’s	only	reason	for	adhering	to	the	norm	requiring	him	to	work	in	the	fields	is	
his	fear	of	the	harm	the	master	will	inflict	upon	him	should	he	fail	to	do	so.			
	 Walzer	maintains	that	“all	socialization	is	coercive,”	and	that	all	existing	
moral	systems	or	ways	of	life	are	themselves	the	product	of	a	process	that	
undoubtedly	included	the	use	of	coercion.		The	key	point,	he	contends,	is	that	
																																																								
3	Michael	Walzer,	Thick	and	Thin	(Notre	Dame,	IN:	Notre	Dame	University	Press,	1994):	27.	
	 6	
coercion	not	play:	“such	a	part	as	to	render	the	agreement	spurious,	a	mere	trick	of	
the	powerful.”4		A	legitimate	social	order,	then,	is	not	one	in	which	coercion	is	
absent,	but	one	in	which	members	of	the	society	in	question	generally	share	an	
understanding	of	when	coercion	is	permissible,	and	what	form	it	may	take.		Nor	
does	the	fact	that	(some	of)	a	society’s	moral	norms	have	their	origins	in	the	use	of	
coercion,	e.g.	that	their	initial	triumph	over	rival	visions	of	the	society’s	common	life	
owed	in	part	to	its	proponents	successful	use	of	violence	against	their	opponents,	
undermine	their	legitimacy.		What	matters	is	the	degree	to	which	the	continued	use	
of	force,	or	the	threat	thereof,	is	essential	to	the	preservation	of	those	moral	norms;	
i.e.	to	the	stability	of	the	social	order	they	constitute.	 	
Like	legitimacy,	radical	coercion	characterizes	a	limiting	case	and	almost	
certainly	an	ideal	type.		Indeed,	legitimacy	and	radical	coercion	serve	as	the	two	
endpoints	along	which	all	actual	societies	fall	at	any	particular	point	in	time,	and	
along	which	they	move	over	time.		Walzer	defends	the	possibility	of	cross-cultural	
recognition	of	radically	coercive	social	orders,	i.e.	of	actual	social	orders	that	closely	
approximate	the	radically	coercive	ideal	type.		As	with	other	elements	of	what	he	
terms	the	moral	minimum,	however,	this	cross-cultural	agreement,	a	shared	
understanding	of	what	constitutes	a	radically	coercive	social	order,	soon	runs	out.		
This	is	so	for	two	reasons.		First,	different	societies	have	different	conceptions	of	
when	coercion	is	legitimate,	as	well	as	the	form	it	ought	to	take.		Second,	all	societies	
depend	for	their	stability	on	a	mixture	of	coercion	and	legitimacy,	on	a	mixture	of	
appeals	to	prudence	and	to	morality.		In	the	case	of	most	actual	societies,	then,	it	will	
																																																								
4	Ibid,	27.	
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be	difficult	to	discern	the	precise	extent	to	which	stability	is	due	to	the	first	or	the	
second	of	these	considerations.	
Whereas	a	legitimate	social	order	consists	in	a	society	organized	according	to	
the	rule	of	law	–	not	merely	positive	law,	but	more	broadly	a	system	of	moral	norms	
that	are	understood	by	members	of	that	society	to	bind	them	categorically	–	a	
radically	coercive	social	order	is	a	society	organized	according	to	the	rule	of	fear	and	
terror.5		When	an	entire	society	is	organized	on	the	basis	of	radical	coercion,	we	
have	a	tyranny.		The	contrast	with	tyranny,	in	this	sense,	is	not	any	particular	form	
of	government,	such	as	democracy,	but	government	in	accordance	with	the	rule	of	
law,	meaning	government	in	accordance	with	a	system	of	norms	most	of	which	are	
recognized	as	legitimate	by	most	members	of	the	society	in	question.	
Walzer’s	moral	relativism	entails	that	we	cannot	compare	different	societies	
in	terms	of	their	justice,	since	there	is	no	single,	common,	conception	of	justice	all	
societies	ought	to	strive	to	realize.		However,	we	can	compare	different	societies	in	
terms	of	their	legitimacy;	that	is,	the	extent	to	which	individuals	identify	with	the	
normative	order	that	structures	their	lives	and	view	conformity	to	its	norms	as	
expressions	of	what	they	believe	to	be	valuable,	or	right	and	good.		It	is	self-
determination	in	this	sense,	one	properly	contrasted	not	only	with	subjugation	but	
also	alienation,	that	Walzer	identifies	as	the	formal	end	at	which	all	human	beings	
collectively	aim.		
II.	
																																																								
5	See	Lon	Fuller,	“Positivism	and	Fidelity	to	Law:	A	Reply	to	Professor	Hart,’	Harvard	Law	Review	
71(4):	630-672.		
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Perhaps	the	most	common	objections	to	Walzer’s	relativist	account	of	the	
nature	of	morality	and	moral	justification	concern	its	implications	for	the	practice	of	
moral	criticism.		In	this	section	and	the	next	I	offer	a	two-pronged	response	to	these	
worries.		First,	I	contend	that	Walzer	offers	ample	grounds	for	criticizing	existing	
moral	norms,	and	places	no	limits	on	who	may	do	so.		Second,	I	argue	that	
frustration	with	the	limits	on	moral	criticism	that	Walzer’s	relativism	does	impose	
reflects	the	tendency	to	what	Walzer	calls	universalism,	the	view	that	the	
conception	of	morality	that	makes	sense	of	one’s	own	life	applies	to	all	human	
agents	as	such,	and	that	it	is	this	tendency	that	is	actually	the	primary	source	of	
many	of	the	evils	people	suffer	at	each	others’	hands.	
Walzer’s	meta-ethics	offers	two	distinct	grounds	for	criticizing	moral	norms	
and	the	practices	they	structure.		The	first	involves	an	interpretive	appeal	to	certain	
components	of	a	group’s	existing	morality	in	order	to	justify	revisions	to	some	other	
part	of	it,	or	to	justify	particular	extensions	of	one	or	more	of	the	community’s	moral	
norms	to	novel	cases.		For	example,	a	person	may	criticize	a	particular	society’s	
refusal	to	allow	its	female	members	anything	more	than	a	rudimentary	education	on	
the	grounds	that	it	is	incompatible	with	their	commitment	to	living	the	way	of	life	
God	commands	them	to	live.		Or	a	society’s	norms	for	distributing	the	costs	of	
educating	the	young	may	be	criticized	on	the	grounds	that	they	are	incompatible	
with	its	commitment	to	equality	of	opportunity.		In	each	of	these	cases,	criticism	
takes	the	form	of	a	vision	or	interpretation	of	the	norms	governing	access	to	
education	that	is	alleged	to	best	express	fidelity	to	that	society’s	other	moral	
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commitments.	Though	criticism	may	often	take	certain	of	those	commitments	to	be	
fixed,	in	principle	no	aspect	of	a	community’s	morality	at	any	particular	point	in	
time	is	immune	to	revision.		Indeed,	history	reveals	that	moral	commitments	that	
appear	immune	to	challenge	at	one	point	in	time	may	not	be	so	perceived	at	
another.	
Though	Walzer’s	meta-ethics	restricts	the	kind	of	reasons	to	which	a	person	
may	appeal	when	criticizing	a	society’s	moral	practices,	it	does	not	limit	the	
standing	to	criticize	a	society’s	moral	practices	to	members	of	that	society.		
Foreigners	may	criticize	a	community’s	practice	of	denying	to	its	female	members	
anything	more	than	a	rudimentary	education	on	the	grounds	that	it	is	incompatible	
with	that	community’s	own	socially	constructed	ideals	even	when	few	or	none	of	the	
female	(or	male)	members	themselves	accept	this	interpretation	of	those	ideals.		
Nevertheless,	actual	revisions	to	a	given	society’s	system	of	moral	norms,	meaning	
the	delegitimizing	of	some	of	its	old	norms	and	their	replacement	with	new	ones	
now	taken	to	be	legitimate,	can	only	be	completed	by	its	members,	since	it	is	only	in	
virtue	of	their	commitment	to	guiding	their	conduct	according	to	particular	moral	
norms	that	those	norms	are	justified.			
Interpretive	moral	criticism	seeks	to	delegitimize	existing	moral	norms	(or	
existing	interpretations	of	moral	norms)	and	the	practices	they	structure	by	offering	
alternative	accounts	of	what	is	permitted,	required,	or	forbidden	by	a	person’s	
identity	as	a	member	of	a	particular	group,	or	the	meaning	of	his	or	her	life	within	
that	community.		It	constitutes	the	form	of	moral	criticism	that	follows	from	the	
replacement	of	truth	with	legitimacy	as	the	measure	of	success	in	moral	argument.		
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The	substitution	of	legitimacy	for	truth	as	a	standard	for	comparing	moralities,	or	
moral	ways	of	life,	provides	the	basis	for	a	second	type	of	criticism	that	can	be	
leveled	against	particular	moral	practices,	namely	that	their	stability	relies	too	
heavily	upon	coercion.		Criticism	in	this	case	is	not	premised	on	any	particular	
conception	of	the	right	way	to	live;	rather,	it	condemns	certain	practices	within	a	
community	on	the	grounds	that	it	denies	the	self-determination	of	some	of	its	
members.		That	is,	it	denies	them	the	opportunity	to	develop	and	live	autonomous	
or	authentic	ways	of	life	with	which	they	identify,	lives	composed	of	norm	governed	
practices	they	view	as	expressive	of	who	they	are	or	of	what	they	value,	rather	than	
as	alien	and	oppressive.				
The	possibility	of	this	second	kind	of	criticism	stands	in	need	of	defense,	
however.		If	a	claim	regarding	the	source	of	a	given	social	practice’s	stability	is	to	
count	as	a	criticism,	an	argument	for	reform	and	not	simply	an	observation	or	
explanation,	then	it	seems	we	must	postulate	something	like	a	right	to	self-
determination	for	all	human	beings.		Yet	postulating	such	a	universal	right,	as	
Walzer	does,	is	at	odds	with	a	relativist	meta-ethics.		I	propose	a	resolution	to	this	
conflict	in	the	next	section.	
III	
“…	We	must	meet	the	requirements	of	our	moral	occasions.		We	must	explain	and	
defend	ourselves,	ground	our	complaints,	justify	our	claims,	situate	ourselves	within	
the	moral	world,	and	contribute	as	best	we	can	to	its	construction	and	
reconstruction.		But	we	do	all	these	things	among	ourselves,	in	some	particular	
here-and-now,	working	with	a	local	set	of	concepts	and	values.	
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Reiterative	universalism	operates	mostly	within	the	limits	of	ours	and	theirs	–	not	of	
reason	with	a	capital	“R”	but	of	our	reason	and	their	reason.		It	requires	respect	for	
the	others,	who	are	just	as	much	moral	makers	as	we	are.”	(“Nation,”	198-99).	
	
The	two	quotations	set	out	above	present	us	with	an	apparent	paradox.		On	
the	one	hand,	Walzer	claims	that	moral	justification	is	always	relative	to	the	moral	
norms	of	particular,	historically	situated,	moral	communities.		The	reasons	we	offer	
when	we	defend	our	own	conduct	or	criticize	that	of	others	are	the	moral	norms	
that	define	and	give	meaning	to	our	way	of	life;	hence	“our	reason.”	On	the	other	
hand,	Walzer	appears	to	assert	the	existence	of	a	universal	moral	principle,	one	that	
binds	all	moral	agents	as	such,	namely	a	requirement	of	respect	for	others	as	moral	
makers.		Assuming	that	Walzer	takes	moral	making	to	be	generally,	and	perhaps	
even	necessarily,	a	collective	undertaking,	a	universal	principle	of	respect	for	others	
as	moral	makers	is	equivalent	to	a	universal	principle	of	toleration	for	communal	
self-determination.		The	claim	that	such	a	principle	exists,	however,	appears	
impossible	to	reconcile	with	Walzer’s	relativist	meta-ethics.	
Of	course,	Walzer	maintains	that	moral	justification	operates	mostly	within	
the	limits	of	particular	moral	communities;	perhaps,	then,	a	principle	of	toleration	is	
an	exception	(indeed,	the	only	exception),	a	principle	that	operates	within	Reason	
with	a	capital	“R”	and	so	binds	all	rational	or	moral	agents	as	such.		The	existence	of	
any	such	principle	seems	difficult	to	reconcile	with	Walzer’s	account	of	the	nature	of	
morality	and	moral	justification,	however.		Though	Walzer	acknowledges	the	
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existence	of	a	moral	minimum,	a	small	set	of	moral	norms	binding	on	all	human	
agents,	the	universal	scope	of	these	norms	consists	solely	in	the	fact	that	they	
constitute	the	set	of	norms	instantiated	in	all	human	societies.6		The	conclusion	that	
all	human	agents	are	bound	by	the	rules	that	make	up	this	set	is	arrived	at	
inductively,	rather	than	being	deduced	from	Reason.		Individuals	are	bound	by	
norms	prohibiting,	say,	murder	and	theft	because	the	moral	norms	that	constitute	
the	shared	way	of	life	they	live	with	other	members	of	a	particular	community	
include	a	norm	prohibiting	such	conduct,	not	because	they	are	rational,	or	children	
of	God,	or	because	of	any	other	property	shared	universally	by	all	human	beings.7			
Nor	does	Walzer’s	conception	of	reiterative	universalism	undergird	a	
universal	principle	of	toleration,	though	he	seems	to	think	that	it	does.8	The	
universality	in	reiterative	universalism	refers	to	a	fundamental	fact	about	all	human	
beings,	a	fundamental	feature	of	human	nature,	namely	that	we	are	moral	makers.		
																																																								
6	See,	e.g.,	“Nation,”	195;	Thick	and	Thin,	Ch.	1.	
7	Moreover	we	should	be	careful	not	to	exaggerate	the	commonality,	and	so	a	kind	of	universality,	
instantiated	by	the	moral	minimum.		As	Walzer	writes,	when	we	consult	the	anthropological	
literature	we	find	“an	overlapping	plurality	of	sets,	each	of	which	bears	a	family	resemblance	to	the	
others.		Hence	we	will	know	them	(all)	to	be	principles	of	justice,	and	we	may	well	be	led,	by	the	
interactions	of	states	and	peoples,	say,	to	interpret	them	in	ways	that	emphasize	their	common	
features.		But	our	interpretations	can	do	no	more	than	suggest	the	differentiated	commonalities	of	
justice	–	for	the	common	features	are	always	incorporated	within	a	particular	cultural	system	and	
elaborated	in	highly	specific	ways”	(“Nation,”	194).		Though	we	can	“abstract	from	the	differences	to	
a	universal	code,	something	like	H.	L.	A.	Hart’s	“minimum	natural	law””	(“Nation,”	194)	that	
abstraction	is	not	itself	a	moral	code	or	morality,	but	an	incomplete	outline	of	a	morality	created	by	
overlaying	the	(more	complete,	or	concrete)	actual	moralities.		Put	another	way,	the	moral	minimum	
does	not	encompass	a	single	prohibition	on	murder	instantiated	in	all	societies;	rather,	the	moralities	
of	all	actual	societies	include	a	prohibition	on	killing	the	innocent	that	overlap	to	some	degree	with	
respect	to	the	act-tokens	they	prohibit,	though	they	also	differ	to	some	degree	on	the	basis	of	
different	understandings	of	innocence,	killing,	the	relevance	of	intention,	and	so	on.		Hence	the	moral	
minimum	consists	in	differentiated	commonalities.					
8	“We	act	immorally	whenever	we	deny	to	other	people	the	warrant	for	what	I	will	now	call	the	rights	
of	reiteration,	that	is,	the	right	to	act	autonomously	and	the	right	to	form	attachments	in	accordance	
with	a	particular	understanding	of	the	good	life”	(“Nation,”	201).		Likewise:	“…the	experience	of	
reiteration	makes	it	possible,	at	least,	for	people	to	acknowledge	the	diversity	of	claims.		…	[I]t	is	a	
moral	act	to	recognize	otherness	in	this	way”	(“Nation,”	195).	
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It	is	a	fundamental	fact	about	human	beings	that	we	wish	to	be	treated,	and	to	treat	
others,	only	in	ways	we	believe	to	be	justified;	that	is,	in	accordance	with	norms	
(moral	or	otherwise)	we	take	to	be	authoritative	or	categorical.9		The	systems	of	
justification	–	moralities,	or	ways	of	life	–	that	human	beings	have	constructed	vary	
greatly,	“but	there	is	something	singular	and	universal	about	[our]	creativity,	some	
brute	fact	of	agency	captured…	by	the	claim	that	all	human	agents	have	been	created	
in	the	image	of	a	creator	God.		Justice	is	the	tribute	we	have	learned	to	pay	to	the	
brute	fact	and	the	divine	image.”10		Yet	the	fact	that	human	beings	feel	compelled	to	
live	a	just	life,	one	in	which	they	are	treated	and	treat	others	justly,	and	so	are	
constantly	engaged	in	the	reiterative	process	of	creating	and	revising	conceptions	of	
justice,	only	explains	why	all	human	societies	have	moralities.		Other	commonalities,	
both	of	human	nature	and	material	circumstances,	explain	the	overlap	in	these	
moralities	that	Walzer	labels	the	moral	minimum.11		But	insofar	as	reiterative	
universalism	is	a	descriptive/explanatory	theory	of	morality,	an	account	of	why	the	
universe	contains	a	multitude	of	diverse	and	sometimes	conflicting	moralities	
grounded	in	a	brute	fact	of	human	nature,	it	cannot	provide	a	basis	for	a	normative	
principle	requiring	toleration,	or	respect	for	communal	self-determination.	
																																																								
9	Perhaps	the	most	compelling	evidence	for	this	claim	comes	from	the	great	and	torturous	lengths	
that	perpetrators	of	injustice	frequently	go	to	offer	putative	justifications	for	their	wrongdoing,	a	fact	
Walzer	has	repeatedly	emphasized	over	the	years.	
10	“Nation,”	192.	
11	“The	experiences	that	make	for	moral	making	have	to	do	most	often	with	lordship	and	bondage,	
that	is,	with	oppression,	vulnerability,	and	fear,	and	pervasively,	the	exercise	of	power	–	experiences	
that	require	us	to	justify	ourselves	and	to	appeal	for	help	to	one	another.	We	respond	to	the	
requirement	creatively,	which	is	to	say,	differently,	though	most	often,	perhaps,	with	the	misplaced	
confidence	that	ours	in	the	only	legitimate	response.		What	the	historical	record	suggests,	however,	is	
that	there	is	a	wide	range	of	possible	responses	and	a	significant	number	of	actual	responses	that	are	
legitimate	at	least	in	this	sense,	that	they	fit	the	experiences;	they	meet	their	requirement	of	their	
occasions”	(“Nation,”	196).			
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This	is	not	to	deny	the	obvious,	namely	that	the	moralities	of	particular	
historically	situated	communities	may	include	a	principle	of	toleration	for	
communal	self-determination.		Indeed,	one	virtue	of	Walzer’s	approach	to	moral	
theorizing	is	that	it	shifts	attention	away	from	efforts	to	formulate	a	single	principle	
of	toleration	that	ought	to	inform	or	be	applied	in	all	pluralistic	human	societies	and	
towards	a	more	empirically	informed	historical	and	sociological	account	of	the	
different	forms	that	toleration	takes,	one	sensitive	to	the	virtues	and	limits	of	each	
form,	and	the	normative	and	material	factors	that	strengthen	or	weaken	their	
legitimacy.		This	change	in	orientation	does	not	preclude	normative	argument;	
rather,	it	simply	highlights	the	fact	that	normative	arguments	regarding	demands	
for	more	or	less	interference	in	a	given	community’s	way	of	life	must	be	made	“in	
some	particular	here	and	now,	working	with	a	local	set	of	concepts	and	values.”12		
The	claim	that	a	person	ought	to	tolerate	certain	moral	practices	partially	
constitutive	of	another	community’s	way	of	life	will	provide	her	with	a	reason	to	do	
so	only	insofar	as	she	can	be	persuaded	that	such	conduct	better	realizes	or	
expresses	than	does	intolerance	some	socially	constructed	ideal	to	which	she	is	
already	committed.		Those	ideals	might	reference	liberal	values	such	as	autonomy	
or	self-government,	or	romantic	values	such	as	authenticity	and	originality,	or	
religious	values	of	universal	love.		In	each	case,	though,	it	will	be	the	morality	that	a	
particular	community	has	made,	and	that	it	continues	to	revise	or	reiterate,	rather	
than	the	fact	that	human	beings	are	moral	makers	that	justifies	the	claim	that	
tolerance	is	required,	permitted,	or	forbidden.	
																																																								
12	Ibid,	199.	
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Though	Walzer’s	rejection	of	what	he	calls	covering-law	universalism	in	
favor	of	reiterative	universalism	precludes	a	deductive	argument	for	a	universally	
binding	principle	of	toleration,	it	remains	possible	to	argue	inductively	for	such	a	
conclusion.		Yet	toleration,	even	when	understood	in	its	weakest	sense	to	involve	
“simply	a	resigned	acceptance	of	difference	[i.e.	different	moralities]	for	the	sake	of	
peace”	clearly	does	not	characterize	all	human	societies,	and	so	a	principle	of	
toleration	cannot	be	part	of	the	moral	minimum	as	Walzer	understands	it.13		That	is,	
toleration	is	not	a	principle	that	binds	all	human	agents	because	all	human	
communities	necessarily	include	such	a	principle	in	their	specific	moralities.		
Consider,	however,	a	weaker	claim	of	necessity,	one	that	holds	only	that	human	
history	necessarily	involves	progress	toward	a	world	in	which	all	human	societies	
practice	toleration,	even	if	variations	in	the	concrete	forms	tolerance	takes	in	
different	societies	are	never	wholly	eliminated.		If	true,	this	progressive	account	of	
history	entails	that	one	day	all	human	beings	will	be	bound	by	a	principle	of	
toleration,	albeit	not	exactly	the	same	principle	and	not	in	virtue	of	a	property	that	
all	possess,	such	as	being	rational	or	a	moral	maker.		Walzer	shies	away	from	claims	
of	this	type,	however.14		Moreover,	our	low	rate	of	success	at	predicting	major	
political	and	economic	changes	such	as	the	collapse	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	
2008	global	recession,	as	well	as	trends	such	as	the	spread	and	increasing	power	of	
religious	fundamentalism	in	the	Middle	East	(and	elsewhere),	should	greatly	
																																																								
13	Michael	Walzer,	“The	Politics	of	Difference:	Statehood	and	Toleration	in	a	Multicultural	World,”	
reprinted	in	Thinking	Politically	(New	Haven:	Yale	University	Press,	2007):	169.	
14	See,	e.g.,	his	claim	in	an	interview	with	David	Miller	that	no	one	knows	whether,	given	a	certain	
path	of	historical	development,	the	ideal	of	human	rights	might	disappear	from	the	landscape	of	
international	justice.		(Thinking	Politically,	303).	
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weaken	any	confidence	we	have	in	an	inductive	case	for	this	vision	of	human	
history.15		Of	course,	a	conception	of	human	history	as	progress	toward	(recognition	
of)	a	universal	morality	or	way	of	life	need	not	be	arrived	at	inductively,	but	Walzer	
rejects	the	alternative	sources,	such	as	divine	revelation	or	a	priori	deduction	from	
principles	of	rationality	imminent	in	that	part	of	human	history	that	has	already	
passed.	
Thus	far	I	have	maintained	that	there	is	no	route	from	Walzer’s	
characterization	of	human	beings	as	moral	makers	to	his	apparent	assertion	of	a	
universally	binding	principle	of	toleration.		I	now	want	to	explore	a	different	
approach	to	linking	Walzer’s	account	of	morality	with	the	practice	of	toleration.		As	
suggested	by	the	reference	to	the	practice,	rather	than	a	principle,	of	toleration,	this	
approach	is	empirical	rather	than	normative,	in	the	following	sense:	it	hypothesizes	
that	given	our	nature	as	moral	makers,	the	rejection	of	universalism,	of	a	belief	in	a	
single	universal	and	objective	morality	binding	on	all	moral	agents,	will	usually	
dispose	human	beings	to	tolerate	the	practices	of	other	moral	communities.		If	so,	
then	moral	theory	can	play	a	practical	role	in	promoting	the	practice	of	toleration	by	
undercutting	those	beliefs	or	world	views	that	typically	motivate	intolerance,	rather	
than	by	demonstrating	that	all	human	agents	as	such	are	required	to	respect	others	
as	moral	makers.		
Though	Walzer	grounds	his	reiterative	universalism	in	the	fact	that	human	
beings	are	moral	makers,	this	fact	about	us	reflects	an	even	more	fundamental	
																																																								
15	The	claim	here	is	not	that	human	history	will	not	lead	to	a	world	in	which	all	human	societies	
practice	toleration,	but	only	that	we	currently	have	insufficient	grounds	to	attach	any	probability	to	
the	occurrence	of	this	outcome.	
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feature	of	human	nature	he	also	identifies,	namely	our	desire	to	treat	others	and	to	
be	treated	by	them	only	in	ways	we	take	to	be	justified.		Moral	making	is	a	response	
to	this	fact	of	human	nature;	it	consists	in	our	efforts	to	work	out	with	those	with	
whom	we	interact	mutually	agreeable	terms	on	which	to	do	so.		Crucially,	for	a	
moral	conventionalist	like	Walzer	the	“agreement”	in	question	here	must	be	an	
actual	one.		One	person’s	treatment	of	another	is	morally	justifiable	if	and	only	if	it	
conforms	to	an	understanding	of	some	standard	of	right	conduct	viewed	by	both	
people	as	legitimate.16		In	the	absence	of	such	an	understanding	regarding	some	
type	of	conduct,	the	person	who	performs	a	token	of	that	type	will	not	be	able	to	
justify	doing	so	to	the	person	his	conduct	affects.		If	we	seek	to	act	only	in	ways	we	
believe	to	be	justifiable,	then	our	inability	to	justify	performing	a	token	of	the	act-
type	in	question	to	those	who	will	be	affected	by	it,	i.e.	to	justify	it	on	terms	those	
people	accept,	will	dispose	us	to	refrain	from	performing	it.		Or	in	other	words,	the	
deep	discomfort	human	beings	experience	when	they	treat	others	in	ways	they	do	
not	believe	to	be	justifiable	will	dispose	people	to	tolerate	the	practices	of	members	
of	other	moral	communities.	
Of	course,	people	often	do	not	default	to	toleration	in	the	face	of	their	
inability	to	arrive	at	a	shared	understanding	of	a	common	moral	norm.		Rather,	the	
far	more	common	response	to	an	encounter	with	difference	is	the	attempt	to	impose	
																																																								
16	As	I	argued	in	the	previous	section,	working	out	this	actual	“agreement”	may,	and	often	does,	
involve	interpretive	criticism	aimed	at	persuading	others	to	reconceive	their	moral	commitments;	
e.g.	the	demands	of	political	equality	or	the	divine	instructions	set	out	in	a	holy	text.		That	is,	it	need	
not	consist	solely	of	bargaining	between	parties	whose	goals	are	taken	to	be	fixed,	though	as	Walzer	
emphasizes	bargaining	and	coalition	building	–	in	a	word,	politics	–	is	also	essential	to	forging	
consensus	vis-à-vis	the	legitimacy	of	a	particular	norm	or	set	of	norms.		See	“Deliberation,	and	What	
Else?”	in	Thinking	Politically.	
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one’s	own	morality	or	way	of	life	on	the	other.		This	does	not	disprove	the	argument	
set	out	in	the	previous	paragraph,	however,	since	those	who	respond	this	way	do	
not	abandon	their	fundamental	commitment	as	human	agents	to	treating	others	
justifiably.		Rather,	they	substitute	for	an	actual	consensus	regarding	the	forms	of	
treatment	they	owe	to	others	and	others	owe	to	them	some	standard	of	the	right	
and	the	good	to	which	all	moral	agents	ought	to	conform	but	that	only	they,	and	not	
their	enemies	(or	victims),	have	discerned.		This	tendency	to	universalism	takes	
many	forms,	from	sacred	revelation	to	agreement	among	rational	agents	in	a	fair	
bargaining	situation	to	the	dictates	of	an	impartially	benevolent	spectator.		What	
unites	these	forms	of	moral	justification,	however,	is	that	they	render	persuading	
others	to	share	one’s	conception	of	morality	unnecessary	(and	so,	at	best,	a	policy	to	
be	followed	only	pragmatically).		The	belief	that	we	have	identified	objective	and	
universal	moral	truths	binding	on	all	moral	agents	as	such	satisfies	our	natural	
desire	to	treat	others	only	in	ways	we	take	be	justifiable,	and	so	enables	us	to	
sustain	our	efforts	to	impose	upon	them	our	particular	moral	way	of	life	even	in	the	
face	of	their	persistent	and,	oftentimes,	violent	resistance	to	it.		As	Walzer	points	
out,	“justification	is	always	moral	in	character,	and	the	justification	of	evil	is	no	
exception.”17			
Given	our	deep	commitment	to	treating	others	justifiably	and	the	centrality	
of	(our)	morality	to	who	we	are	and	what	we	care	about,	universalism’s	
seductiveness	should	not	surprise	us.18		“The	central	problem	of	moral	creativity	is	
																																																								
17	“Nation,”	201.	
18	Universalism’s	attractiveness	is	further	enhanced	when	the	conduct	it	sanctions	as	right	is	also	
advantageous.	
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that	it	encompasses	and	justifies	evil	action,”	Walzer	writes.19		It	does	so	not	because	
it	is	deployed	to	elaborate	or	make	theories	of	immorality	that	people	seek	to	put	
into	practice,	but	through	its	elaboration	of	universal	claims	that	sanction	evil	in	the	
guise	of	justice.		When	exercised	in	this	manner	moral	creativity	becomes	
pathological;	a	condition	that	not	only	systematically	distorts	our	understanding	of	
the	world	we	inhabit	but	that	all	too	often	inspires	us	to	inflict	terrible	suffering	
upon	the	members	of	other	communities	and	to	deny	them	the	self-determination	
that	we	enjoy	and	that,	as	moral	makers,	they	also	naturally	seek.		Once	conceived	of	
in	these	terms,	we	can	see	that	universalism	and	the	intolerance	it	often	breeds	calls	
not	for	another	universalism	-	a	principle	of	toleration	-	which	can	never	be	had,	but	
a	cure,	a	treatment	that	can	combat	the	tendency	of	our	moral	creativity	to	
metastasize	in	ways	that	encompass	and	justify	evil.20				
The	foregoing	argument	implies	that	efforts	to	unmask	the	universalizing	
tendencies	apparently	endemic	to	human	beings	ought	to	figure	centrally	in	our	
efforts	to	promote	toleration.		Walzer	has	been	engaged	in	such	an	effort	for	many	
decades,	of	course.		Examples	include	his	criticism	of	those	who	argue	for	the	in-
principle	permissibility	of	armed	intervention	in	support	of	substantive	moralities	
																																																								
19	Ibid,	201.	
20	Walzer	writes	that	“we	act	immorally	whenever	we	deny	to	other	people	the	warrant	for	what	I	
will	now	call	the	rights	of	reiteration,	that	is,	the	right	to	act	autonomously	and	the	right	to	form	
attachments	in	accordance	with	a	particular	understanding	of	the	good	life”	(“Nation,”	201).		For	the	
reasons	canvased	in	the	main	text,	I	think	this	description	inapt.		The	actual	exercise	of	self-
determination,	or	of	moral	making,	is	a	pre-condition	for	the	claim	that	an	act	is	immoral.		That	is,	
only	in	virtue	of	a	community	having	made	certain	conduct	impermissible,	perhaps	(but	not	
necessarily)	by	conferring	certain	rights	upon	its	members,	or	foreigners,	or	both,	is	it	possible	to	act	
wrongly	or	immorally	by	performing	that	conduct;	e.g.	violating	those	rights.		What	is	universally	
true	of	actions	that	deny	others	self-determination,	such	as	the	use	of	coercion	to	suppress	a	group’s	
attempts	at	reiterative	moral	making,	is	that	they	necessarily	lack	justification.		The	absence	of	
justification	in	this	case	(non-justification?)	is	neither	synonymous	with	nor	does	it	entail	that	one’s	
conduct	is	unjustified	in	the	sense	synonymous	with	wrong	or	immoral.	
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(e.g.	maximal	respect	for	individual	rights,	or	democratic	governance),	and	his	
diagnosis	of	the	tendency	of	national	liberation	movements	to	fall	prey	to	the	same	
universalizing	tendencies,	and	the	oppressive	practices	they	sanction,	of	which	
members	of	that	nation	were	recently	victims.21		In	the	context	of	discussing	the	
latter	point,	Walzer	identifies	as	a	particularly	nice	example	of	the	kind	of	argument	
that	can	contribute	to	the	practice	of	toleration	Martin	Buber’s	response	to	his	
fellow-Zionists	who	thought	Arab	nationalism	artificial	(and	so	took	themselves	to	
be	justified	in	dismissing	claims	grounded	in	it):	“We	know	that…	we	have	genuine	
national	unity	and	a	real	nationalist	movement;	why	should	we	assume	that	these	
do	not	exist	among	the	Arabs?”		In	other	words,	resist	the	urge	to	substitute	a	
universal,	world-historical,	justification	for	one’s	proposed	conduct,	one	that	
renders	unnecessary	the	agreement	of	those	one’s	conduct	will	affect,	for	actual	
engagement	with	others	aimed	at	realizing	some	combination	of	consensus	and	
toleration;	i.e.	a	shared	vision	of	a	culturally	diverse	political	community,	be	it	a	
single	state	or	the	international	community.		Liberated	from	the	pathology	of	
universalism,	our	natural	disposition	to	treat	others	justifiably,	and	so	only	in	ways	
that	they	actually	take	to	be	justified,	will	produce	the	toleration	of	communal	self-
determination	and	the	full	flowering	of	human	creativity	that	Walzer	aspires	to	
promote.		Giving	up	on	moral	truth	shall	set	us	free.		
																																																								
21	See	“The	Moral	Standing	of	States:	A	Response	to	Four	Critics”	and	“Nation	and	Universe,”	
respectively,	both	reprinted	in	Thinking	Politically.		
